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THE HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
EDITOR'S NOTE: Recent decisions by the United States Supreme
Court have systematically limited the traditional role of the exclu-
sionary rule in implementing fourth amendment protections. The
continuation of this trend by the Court in Stone v. Powell and
Janis v. United States has raised a number of questions concerning
the current scope of the rule and the criteria which should be used
in determining its application. The questions raised by these
decisions have provided a basis for the trilogy of student com-
mentary which follows. In the first article, the historical origins
of the exclusionary rule are critically examined, suggesting some
support for the majority views in Stone and Janis. The second
contribution to the trilogy focuses more directly on the reasoning
expressed in Stone, and to a lesser extent Janis, in an attempt to
delineate the rationale utilized by the various members of the
Court in deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule. Finally,
the third article represents a critical inquiry into the Court's rea-
soning in Janis by analyzing the conceptual foundations for the
exclusionary rule in the context of the silver platter doctrine.
INTRODUCTION
The exclusionary rule,' which has recently been thrust to the
forefront of judicial inquiry in United States v. Janis' and Stone v.
Powell,' has its roots firmly implanted in history. While development
of the rule itself is a peculiarly. American phenomenon, 4 the principle it
1. The most comprehensive definition of the exclusionary rule is found in Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), wherein the United States Supreme Court noted that
any evidence obtained through an illegal search or seizure in violation of the fourth
amendment must be excluded as evidence against the defendant in any subsequent crimi-
nal prosecution. Id. at 648, 660. See generally 8 WIGMORE, EVIDNCE § 2264 (Mc-
Naughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
2. 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976).
3. 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976).
4. Of all the major civil and common law countries, the United States is the only
nation that has developed a comprehensive exclusionary rule. Other common law juris-
dictions have generally followed the traditional English view of admitting all evidence,
regardless of whether it has been obtained in an illegal search and seizure. For a
comprehensive analysis of the methods by which other countries deal with illegally
sized evidence, see generally Symposium, The Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign Law,
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protects and the justifications for its existence extend to the very origins
of Western civilization. To fully understand the emergence of the
exclusionary rule as propounded in Boyd v. United States,6 it is neces-
sary to comprehensively examine the philosophical underpinnings of law
as developed in England and the United States.
Essentially, two differing philosophies can be delineated as provid-
ing the justification and derivation of all law in England and the United
States. These philosophies, "positive law" and "natural law" base the
derivation of law on completely different foundations. The positive law
presents the view that man is the creator of law, while the natural law
concept is premised upon the position that all law has always existed,
with man merely the discoverer of law rather than its creator. Ordinari-
ly, such discovery is made by governing bodies. In this important
aspect of derivation, the development of the exclusionary rule represents
an example of the conflict between these varying philosophies. Al-
though the concepts of positive and natural law originated with the
Greeks and Romans," their effects are readily observable upon the
evolvement of the exclusionary rule.
THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
While the genesis of the exclusionary rule itself came in the Su-
preme Court decision in Boyd, the theoretical basis for the rule extends
to antiquity and the well-documented belief in the need for privacy and
personal security from unwelcome and unwarranted intrusion.' Al-
52 J. CRrm. L.C. & P.S. 271 (1961); Parker, The Extraordinary Power to Search and
Seize and the Writ of Assistance, 1 U. BRrr. COLUM. L. REV. 688 (1959).
5. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
6. Positive law is a concept which emphasizes man's role in the development of
law; law that can be altered or amended as the need may arise. The authority for
the enactment of positive law lies with law-makers, the governing authorities. See T.
HOLLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 32-40 (1896).
7. The natural law philosophy varies from the positive law theory both in origin
and application. Natural law is said to exist as an immutable law governing human
rights, transcending any particular governmental or political system. The rights gov-
erned by natural law are deemed to have always existed and their implementation occurs
only when the law is "discovered" by man, usually in the guise of governmental leaders.
Natural law applies indiscriminately to all men and cannot be legitimately contradicted
by the positive law enactments of a particular governing system. See generally F. POL-
LECK, ESSAYS IN THE LAw 31-79 (1969); E. GERHART, AMERICAN LmmETY AND "NATURAL
LAw" 23-31 (1953) [hereinafter cited as GERHART]; GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE
THEORY OF SOCIETY 1500 to 1800, at 38 (1934).
8. See C. MCILWAIN, CONSTrrTUoINALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 23-66 (Rev.
ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as MCILWAIN].
9. The belief in the need for privacy and security from unwarranted invasions
can be traced to the Greeks and Romans. Cicero was one of the first writers to expound
[Vol. 12:32S
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though this need for security was recognized early in history, it received
no official governmental endorsement until 1215 A.D. when English
barons forced the Magna Carta upon King John."0 Prior to this devel-
opment, earlier kings had failed to recognize this right existed because
of their reliance upon the higher natural order thesis, wherein only the
monarch was the discoverer of law.11
The first royal recognition of the positive law theory came with the
Magna Carta."2 King John's capitulation is viewed by some authorities
as the first real limitation on sovereign power."' Other experts disagree,
arguing that this view gives undue emphasis to the Magna Carta's
chapter 39.14 Regardless of the view taken, this chapter has been
widely interpreted as the first feeble effort to give written expression to a
limited right to privacy and protection from unwarranted intrusion by
the sovereign."5
With the ascent to power of the Tudors and Stuarts,,' the concept
of limitations on royal leadership flourished in England, although the
principle of security from governmental intrusion did not. Henry VII,
on the rights of the governed and the need for privacy when he stated: "What is more
inviolable, what better defended by religion than the house of a citizen . . .. This
place of refuge is so sacred to all men, that to be dragged from thence is unlawful."
N. LASSON, THE HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 15 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
LASSON].
10. For a comprehensive analysis of Magna Carta, its background and importance,
see generally A. HowARD, MAGNA CARTA, TExT AND COMMENTARY 5-8 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as HowARD, MAGNA CARTA]; W. McKEcHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 376 (2d
ed. 1914) [hereinafter cited as McKEcHNiE].
11. See generally 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
176 (2nd ed. 1968); Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional
Law, 42 HARv. L. REV. 149, 168 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Corwin].
12. Prior to Magna Carta, there had been no royal acknowledgment of the rights
of anyone but the king to "discover", or indeed, make law. The underlying importance
of Magna Carta is that King John was forced to recognize the authority of English
barons to engage in positive law-making activities as exemplified in the various sections
of the Magna Carta. HowARD, MAGNA CARTA, supra note 10, at 22-23.
13. In particular, this position was endorsed by Lord Coke in INSTrruTs, PART
II 1-79 (1662).
14. Chapter 39 states: "No free man shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised, out-
lawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will We proceed against or prosecute
him, except by the lawful judgement of his peers and by the law of the land." HowARD,
MAGNA CARTA, supra note 10, at 43. Those who feel too much emphasis is given to
this particular chapter rely on later acts of Parliament and the civil war of 1688 as
the major basis for current English views. While conceding Magna Carta's importance
as a whole, they point out that it was a document drawn with specific practical ends
in mind and that any construction beyond these ends was not within the draftsmens'
intent. Id. See McKEcHNiE, supra note 10, at 375-76.
15. McKEcHNm, supra note 10, at 382.
16. The Tudors reigned from 1485 to 1603 and the Stuarts from 1603 to 1714.
R. FRIEs & P. HUGHES, CROWN AND PARLIAMENT ]N TUDoR-STUART ENGLAND 11,143
(1959) [hereinafter cited as FRiEs & HUGHES].
1976]
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the first of the Tudor kings, had no legitimate claim to the throne; to
establish his authority and dominance, he sought the aid of Parliament
which responded by passing a series of acts restricting the rights of
English citizens.17 Of these acts, the most damaging to individual
security was the Star Chamber Act, which established a secret court to
mete out "justice" to enemies, both real and imagined, of the throne.1 8
The Act's principle effect was to divide civil and criminal jurisdiction
and invest broad powers of repression in state officers, including the
authority to invade the privacy and security of suspected criminals. 19
Although royal authority to make law had been diminished by the
limitations of Magna Carta and Henry VIi's reliance upon Parliament to
establish his authority, kings continued to "discover" law through de-
vices like the Star Chamber. The natural law and positive law philoso-
phies vied for acceptance, with the positive law concept gaining wider
recognition among the governed, and the natural higher order theory
maintaining predominance among the ruling figures.20
The excesses of power exhibited by the Star Chamber reached their
height at the time of transition between the Tudors and Stuarts in
1603.21 During its existence, the Star Chamber's warrants were feared
because persons and places in them were not specified, papers and
effects were indiscriminantly taken, and all discretion regarding the
warrant's implementation was left in the hands of the bearer of the
warrant.
22
17. These included the Act of Succession, the Star Chamber Act, Poynings Law,
and the Treasons Act. Id. at 12.
18. Created in 1477, this court determined guilt through private hearings by special
judges appointed by the king who were not restricted to following common law proce-
dures. This court, tyrannical by its nature, could never rid itself of political bias and
acted in each case as a self-serving "judicial" body motivated primarily by presenting
the king with the decision he wanted. Id. at 13. See also 25 SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT
CASES IN THE STAR CHAMBER A.D. 1509-1544 ix-xii (1911); 16 SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT
CASES IN THE STAR CHAMBER A.D. 1477-1509 ix-xi (1902).
19. T. PLUCKNE T, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 182-84 (5th ed.
1956) [hereinafter cited as PLUCrNETTI.
20. With the ascension of King James to the throne, the theory of "divine right"
flourished. In practical application, this concept reflected adherence to natural law prin-
ciples with the king as the "discoverer" of law. This notion of an all-powerful sovereign
was shaken by the concessions of Henry VII and Henry VIII. By 1640, during the
reign of Charles I, rebellion was already brewing at the time of the Long Parliament.
The Parliamentary discontent indicated a movement toward more widespread adoption
of positive law concepts wherein Parliament would "assist" the sovereign by its own
enactments of positive laws. FRuES & HUGHES, supra note 1, at 189-94; E. DELDER-
FIELD, KINGS AND QUEENS OF ENGLAND 86 (Rev. ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as DELDER-
FIELD].
21. See 25 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 489 (1958).
22. As an example of the lack of specificity required and the great discretion given
[Vol. 12:323
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Realizing the need for individual security and attempting to protect
it by limiting the monarch's power, Parliament rejected the arbitrary
treatment fostered by these warrants and, through legislation, ended the
Star Chamber's existence,28 impeaching its chief judge. In one of its
articles of impeachment, Parliament specificially mentioned the invasion
of security with general warrants as a crime. This was the first legisla-
tive recognition that private citizens had a right to protection from
arbitrary governmental exercises of authority: in particular, the right
to be free from abuses of the general warrants.24 However, the prohibi-
tion against general warrants was gradually relaxed and by 1760 the
warrants were again in use.2 , By the mid-eighteenth century, the
continuing issuance of these warrants by the king, as well as by other
members of government, began to attract public criticism.26
In an attempt to quell public unrest, King George I decreed that
publishing without a royal license was a crime and licenses were refused
or withdrawn from publishers who fell into disfavor. The strategy
behind this move was simply that if the public was not exposed to essays
critical of the general warrants, dissention would gradually dissipate.
However, this action prompted further criticism from publishers, news-
papermen, and members of Parliament and was soon tested in the courts
in the cases of Wilkes v. Wood28 and Entick v. Carrington.29  These
cases, which were almost factually identical, were brought within a few
years of each other and both decisions reaffirmed the principles of
individual security earlier recognized in the Magna Carta and Parlia-
ment's actions in abolishing the Star Chamber.
In both cases, the defendants were anonymous, authors of pam-
phlets critical of the general warrants. Through the use of these general
warrants, Wilkes was arrested and his papers seized by several of the
king's messengers, including an agent of the Secretary of State. In the
the bearer of the warrant, a 1596 Privy Council warrant issued for a printer allowed
for the seizure of any articles "'which image touche' his allegiance with authority to
search for and to seize 'all bookes, papers, writinges and other things whatsoever you
shall find in his house to be kept unlawfully and offensively, that same maie serve
to discover the offence wherewith he is charged.'" LAssoN, supra note 9, at 26-27.
23. The specific Parliamentary legislation was entitled "An Act Abolishing the Ar-
bitrary Courts." This was one of a series of acts which served to reduce the power
of the monarchy generally and the Star Chamber Court specifically. FIuFS & HuGHEs,
supra note 16, at 210-11.
24. LAssoN, supra note 9, at 38-39.
25. Fmius & HUGHBS, supra note 16, at 305.
26. See discussion in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886).
27. LAssoN, supra note 9, at 38-39.
28. 3 Geo. 3, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763).
29. 2 K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
1976]
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ensuing decision, an English court found the general warrants to be
illegal, thereby negating the power of the Secretary of State to direct
intrusions into individual privacy and security. 0 The opinion held that
the Secretary of State's power was in contradiction to the principles of
individual security expressed in the English Constitution.3 1 In effect,
the decision provided additional support for the concept that the rights
invaded had their origin in natural law; therefore, they could not be
destroyed by the positive law actions reflected in the royal proclamations
used to justify the search and seizure of Wilkes' property.
The subsequent Entick case produced a similar result. The deci-
sion by Lord Camden of the King's Bench Court has been considered
one of the cornerstones of the British Constitution.82 His opinion
restated the natural law viewpoint, implicit in Wilkes, that there is no
power that can lawfully infringe upon the right of individual security.88
As in Wilkes, the Entick decision reflected a reaffirmation of higher
natural law as the controlling legal authority governing individual secur-
ity, with the judiciary the "re-discoverers" of this right.8 4  This notion
contradicted the traditional theory of natural law discovery, which con-
templated that ordinarily the "discoverers" were the governing authori-
ties. This confusion of derivation authority occurred again at the
inception of the exclusionary rule in Boyd.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
English developments in protecting individuals from unwarranted
invasions of privacy and security had a profound effect upon the percep-
30. 3 Geo. at 18, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498.
31. The Wilkes opinion noted that not only was the Secretary of State's exercise
of power an outrage against Wilkes himself, but against the English Constitution as
well. Id. at 2, 98 Eng. Rep. at 490.
32. In Boyd, the Supreme Court noted that the Entick decision was one of the
"permanent monuments" of the British Constitution. 116 U.S. at 626. The other docu-
ments frequently cited as "cornerstones" are Magna Carta, Petition of Right, Bill of
Rights, and the Act of Settlement. HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA, supra note 10, at 28.
33. Specifically, Lord Camden noted: 'The defendants have no right to avail them-
selves of the usage of these warrants since the [Glorious] Revolution . . . we can safely
say there is no law in this country to justify the defendants in what they have done
.... " 2 K.B. at 291, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817.
34. Although the language in Entick is somewhat obscure and confusing as to what
the court itself thought it was doing, it is readily apparent that, in practical effect,
the judiciary was serving the function of rediscoverer of common law principles based
upon natural law rights. The confusion on this point is obvious when one reviews
the language of Entick itself. See 2 K.B. at 292, 95 Eng. Rep. at 818. See also the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Entick in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627
(1886).
[Vol. 12:323
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 12 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol12/iss2/6
EXCLUSIONARY RULE FOUNDATIONS
tion of American colonists as to their rights, vis ti vis England, concern-
ing invasions of personal freedoms. Due to this background, the colo-
nists were keenly aware of any infringement upon such liberties.
A substantial limitation upon these rights occurred with a Parlia-
mentary enactment authorizing general warrants known as the writs of
assistance.35 These writs were, in essence, "John Doe" search warrants,
permitting the bearer to search virtually any premises at any time.
English customs officials in the colonies used these warrants primarily
to search warehouses, ships, and private dwellings for contraband. 86 The
writs themselves required no oath of affirmation and little specificity
regarding the objects of the search.3
The implementation of the indiscriminate general warrants
prompted a public outcry by the colonists similar to that which occurred
earlier in England. Of particular importance was the opposition ex-
pressed by James Otis38 in his forceful arguments against the re-issuance
of the writs in 1760.39 In support of his contention that the writs not be
reissued, Otis relied on the natural law principles supporting the Eng-
lish Constitution; in particular, he utilized the concept of judicial review
of positive law espoused in Lord Coke's decision in Dr. Bonham's
Case,40 where Coke noted that a positive law enactment could be
judicially negated when it contradicted a natural law right as expressed
in the common law.41  Specifically, Otis stated that "[a]n Act against
the [English] Constitution is void: an Act against natural Equity is
void . . . . The executive courts must pass such Acts into disuse. '42
This statement suggested that courts were empowered to change positive
35. The history of the writ in England dates back to 1662. Because of its special-
ized and limited use as a means of enforcing the customs' laws, however, it did not
prompt the adverse reaction in England that it did in the American colonies. New
Englanders were especially unreceptive to it because it hampered the smuggling they
had undertaken as a result of the Navigation Acts' high taxes. A. HOWARD, TnE ROAD
FROM RUNNYMEDE 134 (1968) [hereinafter cited as HOWARD, RUNNYMEDE].
36. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 47 (1948).
37. HowARD, RuNNYMEDE, supra note 35, at 133.
38. James Otis, a famous Boston lawyer and participant in the constitutional con-
ventions, represented colonial merchants when the decision whether to re-issue the writs
of assistance was being considered by England's representatives in the colonies. Id.
at 134-35.
39. Otis was especially concerned because he felt that devices such as the writs
of assistance placed "the liberty of everyman in the hands of every petty officer."
2 THE LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 140-42 (Wroth and Zobel ed. 1965) [hereinafter
cited as ADAMS].
40. 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 113b, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 646 (1610).
41. Id. at 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652.
42. ADAMS, supra note 39, at 127-28.
1976]
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law that adversely affected natural law rights, which implied that courts
had the right to decide what was natural law. However, these argu-
ments were not persuasive and the writs were reissued. At the Consti-
tutional Convention, the memory of the abuses accompanying the
implementation of these writs spurred Otis to include language within
the fourth amendment protecting against similar invasions." Essentially,
the fourth amendment is based on natural law principles;44 it is not
clearly indicated, however, which law derivations may be used for its
practical implementation.
Early cases which dealt with the fourth amendment revealed judi-
cial restraint in "discovering" any additional natural law rights protected
by this amendment.45  The courts created only positive law to support
the natural law rights delineated in the fourth amendment. The first
and most important of these cases was Commonwealth v. Dana where-
in the defendant was arrested for illegal possession of lottery tickets.
Some of the tickets used as evidence by the prosecution were obtained in
a search of the defendant's office which, Dana contended, violated his
rights.47 After an analysis of the history of the fourth amendment, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court held that only "unreasonable" searches
were prohibited by article 14 of the Massachusetts Constitution, which
contained language identical to that of the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution. Since the search involved illegal contra-
band, the court concluded it was not "unreasonable." under article 14.48
This decision indicated a relatively strict reading of the article and
43. HowARD, RuNNYMEDE, supra note 35, at 136-37.
44. This view is cogently presented in GERHART, supra note 7, at 101-04.
45. See, e.g., Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877); Murray v. Hoboken Land
Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855).
46. 43 Mass. (2 Met) 329 (1841). This case was important for two reasons. First,
the wording of article 14 of the Massachusetts Constitution had the same basic wording
as the fourth amendment to the Federal Constitution:
XIV. Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable
searches, and seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his pos-
sessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause
or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation;
and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected
places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property,
be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of
search, arrest, or seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and
with the formalities prescribed by the laws.
MASS. CONST. art. 14. Secondly, Dana was the first case to interpret this language.
47. 43 Mass. (2 Met.) at 334.
48. Specifically, the court noted that article 14 "does not prohibit all searches and
seizures of a man's person, his papers, and possessions; but such only as are 'unreason-
able,' and the foundation of which is 'not previously supported by oath or affirmation.'
43 Mass. (2 Met.) at 336.
[Vol. 12:328
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suggested judicial reliance on positive law beliefs. This conclusion
appears inescapable in view of the court's holding that positive law
enactments could be used to outline reasonable searches which didn't
contradict the express language of the article. 49
Subsequent to Dana, the next major judicial discussion of fourth
amendment guarantees occurred in Boyd. Events leading up to this
decision developed from the passage of an Act in 1863 to control fraud
upon the customs department. This Act, passed at a time of national
unrest and eventually declared unconstitutional,50 attained its final form
in 1874. 11 Essentially, it mandated the production of suspected smug-
glers' records and assumed guilt upon the failure to produce them. The
Act represented an over-extension of the positive law concept to the
point where it conflicted with the natural law guarantees of the fourth
amendment. It was this conflict the court examined in Boyd.
Factually, Boyd presented a situation where the defendant was
forced to produce invoices which incriminated him by revealing that he
had smuggled glass into the country without paying the required tariff
charges. Boyd revealed the invoices and then challenged the constitu-
tionality of the Act on the basis of the fourth and fifth amendments.c2
In addressing the defendant's contention, the Court first concluded that
although the problem it confronted involved both the fourth and fifth
49. Id.
50. 116 U.S. at 638. See note 51 infra.
51. The original Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 76, 12 Stat. 737 contained a section
which stated, in pertinent part, that where fraud on the revenue had been attempted
or actually committed
[a district court] judge shall forthwith issue his warrant, directed to the col-
lector of the port at which the merchandise in respect to which said alleged
frauds have been committed or attempted has been imported or entered, di-
recting said officer, or his duly authorized agents or assistants, to enter any
place or premises where any invoices, books, or papers relating to such mer-
chandise or fraud are deposited, and to take and carry the same away to be in-
spected; and any invoices, books, or papers so received or taken shall be re-
tained by the officer receiving the same, for the use of the United States, so
long as the retention thereof may be necessary, subject to the control and di-
rection of the Solicitor of the Treasury.
12 Stat. at 740. Section 8 of this same Act stated:
That if any person shall wilfully conceal or destroy any invoice, book, or
paper relating to any merchandise liable to duty. . . or shall at any time con-
ceal or destroy any such invoice, book or paper, for the purpose of supressing
any evidence of fraud therein contained, such person shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor....
Id. Finally, Congress passed the Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 391, 18 Stat. 186. Section
5 of the Act stated that "if the defendant or claimant shall fail or refuse to produce
such book, invoice or paper in obedience to such notice, the allegations stated in the
said motion shall be taken as confessed unless his failure to produce the same shall
be explained to the satisfaction of the court." 18 Stat. at 187.
52. 116 U.S. at 621.
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amendments, 53 it was primarily a fourth amendment controversy. 4 The
Court reasoned that to force the accused to produce incriminating docu-
ments was analogous to compelling him to be a witness against himself
and therefore was equivalent to an unreasonable search and seizure.55
The Court then concluded that any such unreasonable search was void
because it contradicted natural law concepts of individual freedom; 0
hence, any unreasonable search was also unconstitutional.5 Finally, the
Court noted that any materials found through the unreasonable search
were both unconstitutionally acquired and defective as evidence.
The Boyd Court based its decision on the principles of natural law
as it thought they had been interpreted by the draftsmen of the Constitu-
tion and the fourth amendment.58  Relying upon what it believed to be
a well-known principle,59 the Court construed the meaning of "unrea-
sonable" as based on natural law. The term "unreasonable" was of
constitutional dimensions, according to the Court, because of its inclu-
sion in the language of the fourth amendment.60
In effect, the Supreme Court held that any unreasonable search
was unconstitutional because it contravened the natural law right of
personal security outlined in the fourth amendment. In implementing
this holding, the Court simply utilized the exclusionary rule as the
53. In expressing this conclusion, the Supreme Court stated its perception of the
nexus between the fourth and fifth amendments:
Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of ag-
gravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony
or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to
forfeit his goods is within the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other.
116 U.S. at 630 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 622.
55. Id. at 633-35.
56. Id. at 630, 632, 635.
57. Id. at 635.
58. In reference to this point, the Court focused upon Lord Camden's decision in
Entick and how it believed the founding fathers had considered Entick in drafting the
Constitution.
Can we doubt that when the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Con-
stitution of the United States were penned and adopted, the language of Lord
Camden was relied on as expressing the true doctrine on the subject of searches
and seizures, and as furnishing the true criteria of the reasonable and 'unreason
able' character of such seizures?
Id. at 630. Since Lord Camden's opinion may be interpreted as providing strong support
for the natural law position that certain rights exist which cannot be destroyed or cur-
tailed by positive law enactments, it is reasonable to conclude that the Court in Boyd
believed that such concepts had also been considered in the adoption of the American
Constitution. See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
59. 116 U.S. at 626.
60. Id.
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 12 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol12/iss2/6
EXCLUSIONARY RULE FOUNDATIONS
mechanism to protect citizens against unreasonable searches. However,
in developing this mechanism, the Court established the rule as one also
founded in natural law, .that is, the Constitution.
To justify this conclusion, the Court had to rest the rule on the
same natural law principle that underlies the fourth amendment. That
principle was that any invasion of a man's personal security was a
violation of the natural law as propagated by the Constitution!s founding
fathers."1 With this reasoning, it was logical for the Court to assume
that any rule protecting a constitutional or natural law right would also
have as its basis the same constitutional or natural law basis as the right
it was shielding."2 In this matter, the Court reached the conclusion that
the exclusionary rule had its basis in natural law as expressed in the
Constitution.
Two judicial philosophies held by the Court aided it in reaching its
decision. The Court noted that language in the Constitution should be
liberally construed to avoid encroachment upon individual liberties and
its belief that it was the Court's duty to be vigilant in guarding the
constitutional rights of citizens."' By claiming both the right and the
duty to protect the natural law rights outlined in the fourth amendment,
the Court further supported its creation of the exclusionary rule.
Although the Court's reasoning had some logical appeal, it was not
the sole path available for resolving the issue presented it. It is possible
to understand how the Court reached the conclusion that an unreasona-
ble search was unconstitutional; however, it is more difficult to follow its
reasoning for creating a constitutionally based exclusionary rule. If the
Court had adhered to the well-recognized Supreme Court tradition of
deciding issues on as narrow a basis as possible, the Court could not
have logically based the exclusionary rule on natural law constitutional
grounds, because the Court's decision that the search was unreasonable
in the Boyd situation would have obviated the need to have found any
further basis for the decision. It is evident that plausible alternatives
existed in resolving the Boyd issues.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 633.
63. In explaining this portion of the opinion, the Court noted:
[C]onstitutional provisions for the security of person and property should
be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half
their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted
more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for
the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon.
Id. at 635.
1976]
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One realistic alternative to the Boyd decision was presented in the
concurring opinion of Justice Miller in Boyd. Justice Miller concluded
that the Act was void solely on the basis of the fifth amendment
protections against self-incrimination. He noted that the act itself did
not authorize any search and seizure actions but was directed only at
requiring the defendant to produce the incriminating documents him-
selfA4 Had the majority adhered to this position, it would have avoided
the development of any wide-reaching exclusionary rules and could have
decided the case more narrowly.
The other cogent possibility was to base the exclusionary rule on
the narrower and more flexible positive law thesis, rather than on a
broad natural law constitutionalbasis. This approach has several philo-
sophical and practical advantages which the natural law theory does not
possess.
One of the fundamental advantages concerns the manner by which
positive law changes can be harmonized with constitutional protections
as expressed in the fourth amendment. The reasonableness of this
conclusion can be seen when one considers the nature and origin of
fourth amendment protections. There is no language in the fourth
amendment which expressly mandates development of an exclusionary
rule of constitutional proportions. The amendment itself does not
suggest there is a natural law granting all citizens an inalienable right to
have evidence seized in an "unreasonable" search excluded in any
subsequent criminal proceedings. Thus, the argument that the exclu-
sionary rule had a constitutional basis was somewhat presumptive and
arguably erroneous. 65 Moreover, to raise the rule to a constitutional
level accords it a status which mandates its application in every case; a
status that results in a loss of judicial discretion available under a more
flexible rule.
64. Id. at 639.
65. It is clear that in other situations the Court has found that certain rights have
a constitutional basis even though not expressly stated in the Constitution. Such rights
have been developed as "penumbras" of specific, expressed constitutional rights. This
has been particularly true in the privacy area. For a comprehensive discussion of these
penumbral rights, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965). The logi-
cal conclusions in Griswold suggest that such penumbral rights could have been inferred
to exist in Boyd in the guise of the exclusionary rule. Normally, however, penumbral
rights are found where no alternative method by which to protect the interests involved
exists. In Boyd, non-constitutionally-based alternatives existed in the form of possible
positive law enactments, such as making the exclusionary rule an evidentiary rule only
to be applied with discretion by the trial judge, or leaving resolution of the matter
to the legislature.
[Vol. 12:323
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The Boyd Court could have provided a meaningful method by
which to protect fourth amendment guarantees through less drastic
positive law means than a comprehensive exclusionary rule. One pri-
mary method would have been to accord the exclusionary rule the status
of an evidentiary rule. Lower federal courts could then apply the rule
with some degree of discretion under general guidelines provided by the
Supreme Court under its supervisory powers. 6  This procedure, in
accord with positive law theories, would have provided protection for
fourth amendment violations while avoiding the creation of a situation
wherein the protective mechanism (the constitutionally-based exclusion-
ary rule) would be indiscriminately applied without regard to the facts
of a particular case.
A second positive law method would have been to merely outline
the constitutional problem involved, deferring to the legislature for its
protective law enactment to complement the natural law right. The
Court in Boyd recognized this as an alternative but refused to acquiesce
to the legislature.67  Following either of these positive law alternatives
would have provided the Court with a better logical basis upon which to
develop ancillary protective measures to guard against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
CONCLUSION
The fourth amendment has its historical origins in natural law. A
fundamental misreading of the development of protections against un-
66. The Supreme Court may effectuate protections for constitutional rights without
creating constitutionally-based auxilliary rights. The Court may enact protective mech-
anisms to govern lower federal court procedures under its supervisory powers. This
authority is clearly expressed in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) wherein
Justice Frankfurter stated:
Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of
procedure and evidence....
The principles governing the admissibility of evidence in federal criminal
trials have not been restricted, therefore, to those derived solely from the
Constitution. In the exercise of its supervisory authority over the administra-
tion of criminal justice in the federal courts... this Court has, from the very
beginning of its history, formulated rules of evidence to be applied in federal
criminal prosecutions.
id. at 340-41. Arguably, the Court in Boyd could have exercised this supervisory power
and created non-constitutional procedural and evidentiary rules for lower federal courts
to apply to protect against the utilization at trial of evidence obtained in an unreason-
able search and seizure.
67. Regarding this point, the Court in Boyd concluded that due to the "vast ac-
cumulation" of its business, the legislature would not have a sufficient opportunity to
enact timely legislation to deal with the issue presented in Boyd and, therefore, the
Court had to resolve the controversy. 116 U.S. at 635.
19761
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reasonable search and seizure resulted in the Boyd Court's conclusion
that the exclusionary rule was also premised upon the natural law as
reflected in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This confusion over
the derivation of the rule and its proper application has plagued the
Court in subsequent efforts to define the appropriate scope of the rule.
Problems implicit in the exclusionary rule will persist until the Court
finally determines the philosophical basis on which the rule is premised
and how it may equitably be applied to satisfy fourth amendment
guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure.
Bob Redemann
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